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of the statute making it a crime to threaten the life of 
the president. After a public rally against the Vietnam 
War, a de1nonstrator was convicted of making such a 
"threat" when he said, "If they ever make me carry a 
rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J 
.... They are not going to make me kill my black 
brothers." The Supreme Court reversed Watts' con-
viction, holding that his only offense was a "kind of 
very crude offensive method of stating a political 
opposition to the President." 
A different type of case is presented where a defen-
dant truly "threatens" another person with violence. 
In such cases, the state is attempting to protect vic-
tims from tl1e fear of violence and to forestall 
threatened violence. In Virginia v. Black, the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a Virginia statute ban-
ning cross burning undertaken with "an intent to 
intimidate a person or group of persons." The dec-
ades-long history of violence preceded by Klan-
inspired cross-burning supported the determination 
that burning a cross as a mechanjs1n of ll1timidation 
is a particularly virulent threat to one's safety. 
Although the Court's current direction in addres-
sing the relationship between speech and violence is 
more speech protective than the approach followed 
before the 1960s, a better test of that proposition will 
come when speech that "threatens" violence to widely 
held core social values comes to the Court. The Smith 
Act ~rosecutions occurred during an era of deep mis-
trust of Con11nunis1n. Perhaps to1norrow's "threat" 
will arise from vitriolic speakers who stoke the fire of 
disenchanted groups. The central question remains: to 
what extent is the society willing to tolerate speech 
that has the potential of provoking violence? 
JOHN T. N OCKLEBY 
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SPEECH OF GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYEES 
For 1nany years, govern1nent en1ployment was con-
sidered a privilege rather than a right, and, as a result, 
the government could place restrictions on employee 
speech that would be unconstitutional if applied to 
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citizens. An oft-quoted description of this rule is that 
offered by Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of 
New Bedford: "The petitioner may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics but he has no constitution-
al 1ight to be a policeman." This doctrine began to 
erode in the 1950s and by 1967, the Court in Keyishion 
v. Board of Regents could firmly state that the 
doctrine allowing public employers to condition em-
ployment on waiver of constitutional rights had been 
rejected. Accordingly, public employees retain their 
First Amendment rights. 
Nevertheless, the gove111111ent as an e1nployer has 
an interest in regulating employee speech that is great-
er than its interest in regulating citizen speech. The 
goverriment must be able to control employee speech 
to ensure effective and efficient delivery of govern-
1nent services. Thus the task beco1nes dete1~nining 
which govern1nental restrictions on employee speech 
are perntlssible to serve the govern1nental purposes. 
The Supreme Court has attempted, with mixed 
success, to provide the government with traditional 
employer rights without unduly restricting employee 
First At11end111ent rights. 
Proteeted Speech 
To warrant First Amendment protection, employee 
speech must relate to a matter of public concern. 
Dete1mining what is a n1atter of public concern has 
proven to be a difficult task for the courts. The speech 
must relate to iss11es of concern to the con1111unity and 
not to personal grievances of the e1nployee or inatters 
of internal office policy. To detennine whether speech 
is protected courts n1ust look to the content, fo1111, 
and context of the speech. The speech need not relate 
to the employee's job duties or the functioning of the 
government to be protected, although the Supreme 
Court has noted that government employees may 
be in a position to contribute imp011antly to public 
debate by virtue of the knowledge and info1mation 
they possess. 
Government Regulation Burdening 
Employee Speech 
When government regulation broadly burdens the 
speech of govern1nent e1nployees, the gover111nent 
1n11st show that the interests of potential audiences 
for government employee speech and the free speech 
interests of the employees are outweighed by the 
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impact of the speech on the operation of the govern-
ment. Applying this test, the Supreme Court struck 
down a federal statute that ba1Ted federal en1ployees 
fro1n accepting honoraria for speeches or articles 
in U.S. v. National Treasu1;1 En1ployees Union. The 
Court rejected the government's argtm1ent that the 
ban was necessary for government efficiency, finding 
it too broad to constitute a reasonable response to a 
legitimate concern about nllsuse of power. The court 
noted particularly that the ban applied even where the 
speech was unrelated to the employee's service. 
Employee Discipline Based on Speech 
When the issue involves discipline of an individual 
employee for speech, the government's burden of jus-
tification is less onerous. The Court in Pickering v. 
Board of Education held that the employee's free 
speech 1ights must be balanced against the employer's 
interest in "promoting the efficiency of the public 
services its pe1for1ns" to deter1nine whether an 
employer's discipline of an employee for speech vio-
lates the constitution. The Court noted the impor-
tance of allo,ving gove1nn1ent en1ployees who have 
inforn1ed opinions on n1atters of public concern to 
speak without fear of employer retaliation. Employ-
ees can even 1nake public state1nents critical of 
their superiors so long as they are not knowingly 
false or recklessly made and do not interfere substan-
tially with the employee's job performance or the 
employer's operations. Because the test is generally 
applied after employee discipline for speech, the 
court will assess the level of disruption or threat of 
disruption caused by the e1nployee's speech, that is, 
did it interfere with his or her job perfor1nance or that 
of others, hamper en1ployee discipline, or dan1age 
personal relationships in the workplace necessary to 
efficient functioning of the operation. If the damage 
or potential dan1age is sufficiently severe, discipline 
will be upheld despite the protected nature of the 
speech. 
When the government claims that the employee 
discipline was based on reasons other than speech, 
the employee must show that the protected speech 
was a motivatll1g factor in the e1nployer's decision 
to discipline, Mt. Healthy City School District Board 
of Education v. Doyle. If the employee proves that 
the speech motivated the employer, the employer 
can avoid liability by showing that it would have 
disciplined the employee for legitimate reasons even 
if the employee had not engaged in the protected 
speech. 
lndepend"nt Contractors 
These principles for determining the legality of gov-
ernment retaliation for employee speech have been 
applied to termination of independent contractors as 
well, Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr. 
Government Employees and Political Activity 
Although political speech has a high value under the 
First Amendment, restrictions on the political partic-
ipation of government employees have been found 
constitutionally permissible. The federal Hatch 
Act, which in its earlier iterations barred virtually all 
federal employees from engaging in political manage-
ment or political campaigns, survived constitutional 
challenge in United States Civil Service Con11nission v. 
National Association of Letter Carriers. Accordingly, 
similar restrictions by state and local governments are 
also constitutional. The Hatch Act does not bar 
employees from expressing opinions on political sub-
jects and candidates, however. In addition, in 1993, the 
Hatch Act was revised to. permit most federal employ-
ees to participate in political campaigns, with specified 
exceptions. However, with very limited exceptions, 
federal employees are still barred from rnnning for 
partisan political office, campaigning while on duty, 
and soliciting political contributions. 
Govermnent employees are free to join political 
parties and cannot be discriminated against on the 
basis of their political affiliation unless they serve 
in high-level positions where party affiliation is a 
legitimate job qualification, R1.1tan v. Republican Party 
of Illinois. Elected politicians should be able to appoint 
high-level advisers and officials that agree with their 
policy agendas, but employees without such responsi-
bilities are free to choose their party affiliation without 
fear of retribution from their employer. 
In addition, government employees cannot be 
forced to subsidize political speech with which they 
disagree, either through union dues, Abood v. Detroit 
Board qf Education, or direct political contributions, 
Acevedo-Delgado v. Rivera. 
ANN c. HODGES 
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SPEECH VERSUS CONDUCT 
DISTINCTION 
Perhaps one of the most controversial issues is Jheth-
er the part of the First Amendment that protects free 
speech should ever protect conduct. In other words, 
can conduct be a form of speech for First Amendment 
purposes? A typical model of free speech protection 
unfolds this way: I stand on my soapbox in the park 
and share with the world my opinion on a contentious 
topic of the day. A police officer walking by might 
like to poke me with his nightstick and encourage 
me to move on. But the First Amendment can be 
interpreted as preventing a public authority from 
interfering with my reasonable use of public spac;e to 
air my views. ' 
Now consider my using the same soapbox but to 
stand on while I light and then burn an American flag. 
One way of distinguishing this case from the previous 
one is to point out that far more people may be 
offended by my burning the flag than would be by 
1ny views on any given subject, even if shouted at the 
top of my lungs. Or maybe the key should be the 
difference between speech and conduct-in the first 
instance it was "only" speech in which I was engaged, 
whereas in the second, I was not speaking at all but, 
instead, doing something physical and engaging in a 
form of conduct highly repugnant to many citizens 
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